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1. TNTRODUCTI~N 
The Walras Equilibrium Theory explains the determination of the prices 
of commodities resulting from the interaction of agents through markets, 
provided all economic agents take the price system as given. The number 
of participants in the economy does not enter explicitly into the analysis. 
It has been agreed that the assumption of the price-adapting behavior is 
justified only if the economy is large and the agents are small since then 
no agent can significantly influence the price system. Intuitively, there 
should be a significant difference between the equilibrium analysis of a 
small and a large economy. Therefore, one should explicitly consider the 
size of an economy as characteristic datum. 
An economy is not in equilibrium if one agent or a group of agents 
can carry out decisions under the current circumstances which are more 
advantageous to them than the current state. The underlying notion of 
equilibrium is based on the behavioral assumption that economic agents 
follow their preferences and that to achieve a preferred situation they 
are willing to cooperate. This notion of equilibrium leads to the basic 
concept of the core of an economy. In a pure exchange economy, a 
redistribution of the total resources is said to be blocked if there is a 
group of agents who, using the resources available to them, can make 
each member better off. The core of an exchange economy is defined as 
the set of all unblocked redistributions. 
A strong justification for the use of prices and the assumption of the 
price-adapting behavior would be the identity of the set of price-equilibria 
and the core. However, in general, the set of price-equilibria is a proper 
subset of the core. Thus, the Walras Equilibrium Theory neglects viable 
redistributions as possible outcomes of the exchange process. As mentioned 
before, a justification is usually given by saying that the Walras Equilibrium 
Theory should be applied to large economies. This argument would find 
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its precise formulation if one could show that for large economies the set 
of price-equilibria and the core do not differ significantly. 
Indeed, for a special type of large economies this has been shown by 
Edgeworth [Ill in 1881, Scarf [22] in 1962 and Debreu and Scarf [IO] 
in 1963. If, to the assumption made in [lo], we add that x < y implies 
that y is at least as desired as x by every agent, then the result of [IO] 
can be stated as follows: let & denote an exchange economy and C$ the 
n-fold replica-economy.l For every E > 0 there exists an integer fi such 
that for every II 3 fi and every allocation g in the core of the economy &m 
there exists a price-equilibrium (p, f) for the economy c?$ with the property: 
I g, -fa I < E for every agent a in the economy & . Thus, for a large 
replica-economy there is essentially no difference between the set of price- 
equilibria and the core. This is a very strong result; however, it applies 
only to quite particular large economies. 
Instead of considering a sequence of economies and looking for an 
asymptotic identity one may reason “in the limit,” i.e., one considers 
economic systems with more than finitely many participants and proves 
that the identity holds in this case. The first result along these lines has 
been proved by H. Scarf [22] in 1962, and was simplified by G. Debreu [7] 
in 1963. The idea of reasoning in the limit was found a very elegant 
formulation by R. J. Aumann [l] in 1964. Aumann has given a precise 
formulation of an economy in which no agent can influence the outcome of 
collective activities by introducing the concept of an atomless measure 
space of economic agents (continuum of agents). He showed that for such 
very large economies (the number of participants is uncountably infinite) 
the core and the set of price-equilibria coincides. A different derivation 
of this result has been given by K. Vind [25]. 
Thus, we have a justification of the price-mechanism for economies 
with an atomless measure space of economic agents. But, as an economist, 
our interest in these “ideal economies” is proportional to how much new 
information can be derived for large but finite economies. In other words, 
the relevance of the ideal case to the finite case has to be established. 
This is the main topic of the paper. 
In Section 2 we show that a pure exchange economy is most conveniently 
described by a measure (distribution) on the space of agents’ character- 
istics. Using this representation we show that a sequence (&) of replica- 
economies converges (this is made precise later) to an economy with a 
continuum of agents, say gm . The result of Debreu and Scarf [lo] can 
now be decomposed into the following three properties: 
1 In other words, if the economy 8 consists of m agents a, ,..., a,,, , then the n-fold 
replica-economy 8,, consists of n.m agents {Q}, i = l,..., m; j = l,..., n where agents 
aij and aij’ have the same characteristics. 
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(1) Upper hemi-continuity of the core-correspondence: For every 
sequence (.f& wheref, belongs to the core of & , there exists a subsequence 
(fng) converging (this is made precise later) to an allocationfwhich belongs 
to the core of the limit economy 8- . 
(2) Lower hemi-continuity of the equilibrium-set-correspondence: For 
every price-equilibriumf for & there exists a sequence (Q, wheref, is a 
price-equilibrium for 8n , such that fn converges to f. 
(3) The core and the set of price-equilibria for 8m coincides. 
As R. Aumann has shown, the last property holds for every atomless 
economy, not just for economies which are limits of replica-economies. 
Property one and two are quite different in nature and, we are convinced, 
have to be approached by entirely different methods. In this paper we 
concentrate on the first property. We shall obtain only a partial solution, 
namely, that the core-correspondence has a continuity property which is 
closely related to upper hemi-continuity. The second problem is unsolved; 
however, the work of G. Debreu in [9] shows the way in which the problem 
has to be approached. 
2. ECONOMIES AS MEASURES ON THE SPACE 
OF ECONOMIC AGENTS' CHARACTERISTICS 
In economic theory an economic agent who participates in a pure 
exchange economy is characterized by his resources, his needs and his 
preferences. In mathematical economics these concepts have the following 
precise and restricted formulation: The resources of an economic agent 
will be described by a point w in the commodity space R1 = S, his needs 
by a nonempty subset X of S, called his consumption set, and his preferences 
by a reflexive binary relation, <,, defined on the consumption set X. 
The graph P = {(x, v) E X x X I x <, v} of the relation <, is called the 
preference set associated with the consumption set X and preference 
relation <,. A nonempty subset PCS x S is a preference set (i.e., the 
graph of a reflexive binary relation) if (x, v) E P implies (x, x) E P and 
(v, u) E P. Let 9 denote the set of all closed preference sets in S x S. 
An economic agent with the characteristics (X, <,, w) is described by 
a point (P, w) in the Cartesian product B x S. For the generic point a in 
9 x S we denote the corresponding consumption set, preference relation 
and initial resources by X(u), <,a , w(u), respectively. 
In the following we shall need a precise formulation of the intuitive 
concept of “similar” economic agents. To accomplish this one introduces a 
topology on the set 9 x S. It is natural to define the topology on 9 x S 
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as a product of a topology on B and a topology on S. On the commodity 
space S we have the usual topology of R1. It remains to define a topology 
on the set B of preference sets which reflects the intuitive idea of “similar” 
needs and tastes. 
Y. Kannai [19] has introduced for the first time a topology on the set 
of preference relations. Kannai considers continuous and monotonic 
preference relations defined on the positive orthant of R1 and introduces 
a metric such that this set of preference relations becomes a separable 
metric space. 
The general case, where different agents may have different closed 
consumption sets and arbitrary continuous preferences has been studied by 
G. Debreu [8]. Apart from the generalization, the essential result in [8] 
is the upper hem&continuity of the demand correspondence &r,p) with 
respect to both variations in prices and agent’s characteristics. G. Debreu 
uses on B the topology of the Hausdorf distance 6 which is defined by 
a(P, P’) = inf{E E (0, co] I P C B,(P’) and P’ C B,(P)}, 
where B,(P) = {x ES x S I inf,,, d(x, y) < E} denotes the open E-neigh- 
borhood of the set P in S x S with respect to the metric d on S x S. 
It is well-known (Hausdorff [13, pp. 166-1681) that 6 has all properties 
of a metric with the exception that the distance of two sets may be infinite. 
Typically, the preference sets P in B are not compact. In this case 
the set B with the topology of the Hausdorff distance is, in general, 
not a separable space. Since, for the purpose of this paper, it would be 
convenient to work with a separable space of agents’ characteristics we 
introduce a separable topology on B (which is coarser than the topology 
of the Hausdorff distance) with respect to which the results of G. Debreu 
in [8] still hold. This topology has been proposed by J. F. Mertens in 
an unpublished paper. It generalizes the topology used by Kannai to the 
situation where the consumption sets are not restricted to the positive 
orthant and the preferences are not assumed to be monotonic. 
One easily verifies that a sequence &) of preference relations converges 
to a preference relation 5 in the sense of Kannai if and only if 
Lim Inf(P,) = P = Lim Sup(P,), 
where P, (resp. P) denotes the graph of the preference relation <,n 
(resp. <,>, Lim Inf(P,) is the set of points x in S x S such that every 
neighborhood of x intersects all the P, with sufficiently large n and 
Lim Sup(P,) is the set of points x in S x S such that every neighborhood 
of x intersects infinitely many P, . 
This concept of convergence for subsets, called by F. Hausdorff “closed- 
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convergence,” has been studied extensively in the mathematical literature, 
e.g., F. Hausdorff [13, pp. 168-1701, C. Kuratowski [20, pp. 241-2501, 
G. Choquet [4], P. D. Watson [26], J. Flachsmeyer [12]. 
It is known that on the set of closed subsets of a separable locally 
compact metric space (e.g., S ‘x S) one can define a metrizable and 
separable topology2 whose corresponding concept of convergence is 
exactly the closed convergence as defined above. The topology in question 
is most easily defined by relating it to the Hausdorff distance. In fact, 
consider the one-point Alexandroff compactification Y of the locally 
compact space S x S and the set of closed subsets of Y with the Hausdorff 
distance 6 y. Since S x S is a separable metric space we obtain a compact 
metric space and the metric-convergence and the closed-convergence 
coincides (Hausdorff [ 13, pp. 17 l-l 721). By associating the closed subset P 
ofSxSwththeclosedsubsetPu(co)ofY=SxSu{~)wesetup 
a one-to-one correspondence between 9 and a subspace of the compact 
metric space of closed subsets of Y. Hence, if we define a metric d on 9 by 
d(P, P’) = S,(P u {co}, P’ u (co}), 
9 becomes a separable metric space and one verifies readily that conver- 
gence with respect to the metric d is equivalent to closed convergence. 
A metrizable topology has thus been defined on the space A = 9 x S 
of agents’ characteristics. It remains to justify, in economic terms, the 
particular choice of the topology. Intuitively speaking, “similar” agents 
behave similarly in similar situations. The following results justify the 
choice of our topology: 
(I) The set {(a, x, ~1) E A x S :< S / x <,a y} is closed in A x S x S. 
(2) Zf the sequence (a,) converges to a in A, then 
Lim Inf X(a,,) = X(a) = Lim Sup X(a,) 
(3) Let the subset M of A x S be such that for every (a, p) E M the 
consumption set X(a) is convex, <,, is a complete preordering, the budget set 
r(a, p) = {x E X(a) I p . x < p . w(a)} is compact and inf{p . X(a)} < p . w(a). 
Then the demand correspondence 5 of M into S is upper hemi-continuous3 
(((a, p) is the set of greatest elements for <,a in the budget set y(a, p)). 
2 A basis of this topology is given by sets of the form Q(K, G, ,..., G,) = 
{FE S 1 Fn K = 4 and Fn Gi # 4, i = l,..., n} where K is a compact subset, 
G, ,..., G, are open subsets and S denotes the set of all closed subsets. 
3 A correspondence q~ of a topological space T into a topological space S is called 
upper hemi-continuous if for every t E T and every open set Q containing p(t) there 
exists a neighborhood V of t such that v(t’) C % for every t’ E V. 
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These results have been proved by G. Debreu [S] for the topology of 
the Hausdorff distance. One easily verifies that they also hold for the 
topology of closed-convergence, which is used in this paper (see 
Appendix A). 
A pure exchange economy is a finite set of economic agents, i.e., 
a finite family of points in A. Since we are interested mainly in large 
economies and, in particular, in the comparison of large economies of 
different sizes it is most appropriate to describe the family of points in A 
defining an economy by its distribution in A. This leads us to consider 
positive measures4 v on the metrizable space A with v(A) = 1. 
A measure v on A is called simple if v is a uniform distribution over 
finite many points in A, more precisely, if there exists a finite set supp(v), 
called the support of v, such that v[supp(v)] = 1 and u(u) = ~(a’) for 
every a, a’ E supp(v). 
A simple measure v on the space A defines an economy 8” in the 
following way: the characteristics of the economic agents participating 
in the economy ~5’” are given by the points which belong to the support of 
the measure v. We symbolize this by writing 8” = supp(v). Let f denote 
a function of A into Rz and B a subset in supp(v). Then the integral 
J 
1 ~-- c f(4 
B f dv = # SUPP(4 (La 
is interpreted as the commodity vector allocated to the coalition B 
(by the rule f) but measured in units which are # supp(v) times greater 
than the original units of the commodity space. Hence, an integral with 
respect to a simple measure v does not refer to the original units of the 
commodity space (which are used to represent one agent as a point in A) 
but to units which depend on the number of participants (i.e., # supp(v)) 
in the economy 8” .“) 
In an economy 8” defined by a simple measure v on the set A two 
participants never have the same characteristics, i.e., are never of the 
same type. This may seem too restrictive because the literature mentioned 
in the introduction postulates that the economy in question is built up 
by m types and r agents of each type. In order to include this situation 
in our analysis we replace the set A by the product 9 x S x I, where I is 
any metric space, e.g., the set of integers or the unit intervalG If we 
* A measure on a metrizable space, say M, is a u-additive set function defined on the 
Borel-field go, i.e., the u-algebra generated by the open sets in M. For details see, 
e.g., Billingsley [3] or Parthasarathy [21]. 
6 This interpretation, which differs from that in [15], has been suggested to me by 
E. Malinvaud and C. Henry. 
6 This device is due to T. Bewley. 
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do so, we can distinguish an arbitrary number of agents of the same type. 
More generally, one can consider an economy as a mapping of a measure 
space into the space A of agents’ characteristics. This is the point of view 
of Aumann in [I] and [2] as well as Y. Kannai in [ 191 and the author in [ 141 
and [16]. 
Until now we have considered only simple measures on A. In principle 
we can use the same terminology for any measure even though we lose the 
direct interpretation. As in the case of simple measures, the support of 
the measure defines the set of economic agents participating in the 
economic system described by the measure. The support of a measure v 
on A is by definition the smallest closed subset in A with full measure. 
The support of a measure on A always exists since A is a separable metric 
space (Parthasarathy [21, Theorem 2.1, p. 271). For the purpose of this 
paper it seems sufficient to consider a relatively small class of measures, 
namely, measures with compact supports. Let us denote the set of these 
measures by AC(A). 
The restriction to measures with compact support is not essential. 
Most results can be generalized to arbitrary measures. However, the 
formulation of the results and the proofs become more complicated. The 
essential point is that we need a class of measures containing all simple 
measures and which is large enough to contain some measures whose 
support has the power of the continuum. Thus, it is natural to go from 
finite to compact supports. 
If v is a measure in J&‘,(A) we use-in analogy to simple measures-the 
following terminology: The measure v describes an economic system; 
the participants are given by the support supp(v) of the measure v. Every 
Bore1 subset B in A is a coalition and the number v(B) gives the fraction 
of the totality of agents belonging to the coalition B. An allocation for v 
is a v-integrable function f of supp(v) into S such that fa E X, for v-almost 
every a E supp(v). We give no interpretation to JBfdv; however, the 
relation Jsfdv = fs g dv means that if the commodity vectorf, is allocated 
to every agent a E B, then it is possible to redistribute the commodities 
allocated to the coalition B among its members such that every agent a E B 
obtains the commodity vector g, . In particular, the allocation f is 
attainable if sA f dv = sA w dv. An allocation f for v is blocked if there 
exist a Bore1 set B in A and an v-integrable function g of B into S with 
g, E X, for every a E B such that 
(b.1) as. in B, fa -=C, g, , 
(b.2) v(B) > 0 and f, g dv = 1 w dv. 
B 
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The set of all attainable unblocked allocations for Y is called the core 
of v. For short, we denote the set .JZc(A) by E and shall refer to measures 
in E as economies. 
An economy where no agent can influence the outcome of the collective 
activities is now described by a measure v E E with the property: 
VW = 0 for every a E supp(v). 
Measures with this property are called atomless. Clearly, the support of 
an atomless measure is an uncountably infinite set. A question arises at 
once: Can an atomless measure be conceived as a limit of simple measures ? 
To answer this question we need a precise concept of limits or, more 
generally, a concept of similarity for measures. 
A measure v in E is a distribution of agents’ characteristics. Therefore, 
it seems natural to say that two measures v and p are similar if they assign 
similar weights to every coalition, i.e., the similarity is expressed by 
the number 
inf{c > 0 I 1 v(E) - p(E) < E for every E E gA}. 
This notion of similarity would be too strong for our purpose. However, 
a slight modification will give us the right concept. We shall say that 
two measures v and p on A are similar if they assign similar weights to 
similar coalitions. This intuitive notion of similarity is made precise 
by the following definition of a metric p on the set E: 
p(v, I*) = inf{E > 0 ] for every E E .B’*, v(E) < p(B,(E)) + E 
and p(E) d vW9 + 4 
(B,(E) denotes the e-neighborhood of E with respect to a certain metric 
in A). 
One can easily show that p has all properties of a metric (Billingsley 
[3, Appendix III, p. 2381); p is called the Prohorov metric. As in the case 
of the Hausdorff distance on subsets of a metric space, one can show that 
the topology of the Prohorov metric p on E, called the weak topology, 
is independent of the particular metric used in A. It only depends on the 
topology of A. 
A sequence (v,) of measures is convergent to the measure v in E with 
respect to the metric p if and only if lim, J” h dv, = J h dv for every 
continuous and bounded function h of A into R. (Billingsley [3, Appendix 
III, Theorem 5, p. 2381). We call such a sequence (weakly) convergent. 
As an illustration, consider a sequence (&) of economies, where all 
economies have the same number of participants, say (anI,..., anr) = gn . 
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Assume the sequences (cz,~),,~ ,... converge to ai in A, i = l,..., r. Let 
v, and v denote the simple measures describing the economy C% and 
d = (a, )...) a,}, respectively. Then the sequence (un) converges weakly 
to v. Thus, in particular, in a given economy d a small shift in taste 
of one or several agents gives rise to an economy which is similar to the 
economy 8. However, more importantly, we can also compare economies 
of different sizes. 
THEOREM 1. Let v be an atomless measure in E. There exists a sequence 
(v,),=~,... of simple measures on A converging weakly to v and such that 
6) SUPP(~ C s~pp(v~+~) C supp(v). 
Proof. Since supp(v) is a compact metric space, there exists for 
every integer n > 0 a finite partition 5Y2”” of supp(v) in Bore1 sets such that 
the diameter S(Z) = sup ,,,,,Z d(a, a’) < l/n for every Z E 8”. For every 
Z E 2’“” with v(Z) > 0 we can find a rational number r; > 0 such that 
In the case v(Z) = 0 let rg = 0. Since the numbers rg, Z E ~9, are 
rational, they can be written in the form 
where pi and qn are integers. 
Now we define the sequence (v,) of simple measures. In the case n = 1 
we choose pi different points in every set Z \ N, where Z E %“l and 
N = un (Z / 2 E 3”” and v(Z) = O}. This is always possible since the 
measure v is atomless. Define v1 as the simple measure concentrated on 
these points. Thus, we have 
1 _ ?m n S~PPb41 r2 - 
# suPP(%) 
for every Z E %“I. 
Next, consider the partition sn, n > 1. We now add to supp(v,-,) 
points chosen from supp(v) \ N until we have k . pz points in every 
Z E 37, where k is an integer such that k . pg > #[supp(vn-J u Z] 
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for every 2 E 3’““. We define the measure v, as the simple measure 
concentrated on all these points. Thus, we have 
#CZ n suPP( rn - - 
Z- # supp(v?z) 
for every Z E 8”. 
It remains to be proven that the sequence (v,) converges weakly to v. 
Let J’be any continuous and bounded function of A into R, say bounded 
by 1, and let E > 0. Sincef is uniformly continuous on supp(v) we have 
for n sufficiently large 
If@) -fWl G E for every a, a’ E Z, where ZE 8”. 
Clearly, 
jJ- dv - jAf dvn = zLn Uzfdv - Jzfdv4* 
Now, if 5 E Z n supp(v,), we have: 
1 j fdv - 
Z 
j 
Z 
f dv, 1 < ) j 
Z 
[f - fG>l dv / + I v(z) .f(Z> - r2 .f(a>l 
< v(Z) . E + 1 v(Z) - rg ] + r: . E. 
Hence, according to (1) and (2) 
/ j,f dv - jAf dvn j G 3. E for n sufficiently large. Q.E.D. 
The following properties of the sequence (v,) of simple measures and 
the atomless measure v in Theorem 1 are useful in interpreting the weak 
convergence. 
(ii) supp(v) = closure [$r supp(v 
(iii) For every a E A and every E > 0 there exists a neighborhood U 
of a such that vn(U) < E for all y1 sufficiently large. 
A proof is given in Appendix F. 
Theorem 1 is easily interpreted. Every atomless measure v E E can be 
considered as a limit of a sequence (8&=1,... of economies (i.e., simple 
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measures); one obtains the economy &,, , m > n, by adding agents to 
the economy 8, . Since # &$a ---f cc (a consequence of (iii)) one actually 
adds more and more agents all of whom are chosen from the compact 
set supp(u). This set, in turn, is uniquely determined (according to (ii)) 
by the countably many agents forming the sequence. One adds to them 
all agents which are “indistinguishable similar.” Furthermore, in forming 
the sequence (8,) one adds the agents in a certain uniform way, expressed 
by property (iii) which reads: for every agent a and every E > 0 there 
exists a neighborhood U of a such that 
for all n sufficiently large. 
Remark. Consider a sequence (&),X1,... of economies with properties 
(i), (ii), and (iii), where supp(~) is replaced by any compact set. Does 
this sequence determine an atomless limit measure? One can show the 
following partial converse of Theorem 1: 
Let (v&=~,... be a sequence of simple measures on A which has 
property (iii) and such that all supports belong to a compact set K in A. 
Then there exists an atomless measure v E E which is the weak limit of a 
subseqzience (Y&=~,... of the sequence (v~). 
EXAMPLES. 1. Let a, ,..., a,, be nz points in A. For every integer n we 
define an economy 
4 = {a, ,..., a, ,..., a 
n-times 
m ;myY& 
&n is called the n-fold replica economy of &r . These economies have been 
studied by Edgeworth, Scarf, and Debreu. 
Consider the sequence (xn) of points in the unit interval [0, l] defined 
by xn = nu - [nv], where 0 is any irrational number and [nv] the greatest 
integer less than nv. 
Consider the metric space [0, I] x {a, ,..., a,,} (see Fig. 1). Let v, denote 
the uniform distribution over the set {(xj , ai)}i,l,...,nl;j,l,...,~~ . Clearly, the 
measure v, describes the economy &. According to the theorem of 
H. Weyl (Billingsley [3, p. 511) the sequence (vJ of simple measures 
on [0, l] x A converges weakly to an atomless measult V, where 
and 
SwW = P, 11 x {aI ,..., a,> 
d-4 = k f X(([O, l] x (ai}) n E); 
2=1 
h denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0, 11. 
6421212-s 
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lO,ll x A 
A 
arr --x 
0 x5 x3 x1 x4 X2 1 
FIG. 1. The points of supp(v,) are indicated by X, where u = d/z. 
2. Given m preference sets PI ,..., Pm in 8. We consider economies 8 
with the following property: if 8 = {(Pi , wJ>~~, then Pi E {PI ,..., P,} 
(see Fig. 2). Such an economy is described by the resource distribution for 
every preference set Pi. Consider the distribution function instead of the 
measure. Let Fi : Rz -+ [0, l] denote the distribution function of resources 
for the preference set Pi . Thus, P(x) is the fraction of agents with 
preference set Pi whose initial resource vector is less than the vector x. 
FIGURE 2 
Let & (rt = l,...) and d be economies of the above type and let vn and v 
denote the corresponding measures on A. If F,“(x) converges to F”(x) for 
every x in R” (or 0% a dense subset in Rz), then the sequence (v,J converges 
weakly to v (Billingsley [3, p. 181). Further, the measure v is atomless if 
the distribution functions Fi (i = l,..., m) are continuous. 
3. Let v be any distribution of agents’ characteristics in E. Consider 
an independent sample of size n of the distribution v. The sample of size n 
defines an economy (sample economy) with n agents which we denote 
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by & and its corresponding measure by v, . Thus, v, is the sample distri- 
bution. Then, with probability one, the sequence (v,) converges weakly to v 
(Parthasarathy [21, Theorem 7.1, p. 531). 
3. THE CORE OF ATOMLESS MEASURES 
The following result, proved by R. Aumann in [l] and [2], shows the 
characteristic property of economies where no agent can influence the 
outcome of the collective activities. 
THEOREM (Aumann). Let v be an atomless measure in E such that for 
every a E supp(v), 
(a) X(a) = R: and <,a is a complete continuous and strongly 
monotonic7 preordering. 
(/3) w(a) 3 0 and j w dv > 0. 
Then the core of v is nonempty and identical with the set of price- 
equilibria for v. 
We have only to verify that for every coalition B with v(B) > 0 there is a 
coalition E C B such that 0 < v(E) < v(B) (for a proof see Appendix F (1)) 
and that the set {(a, x, y) E supp(v) x S x S j x <, y} belongs to the 
product a-algebra G?(supp(v)) @ g(S) @ a(S). Since the set ((a, x, y) E 
supp(v) x S x S 1 x <,a y} is closed it follows that the above set is a Bore1 
set in supp(v) x S x S. But the separability of the three spaces implies that 
S?(supp(v) x S x S) = ~(supp(v)) 0 L&S) 0 a(S) (Parthasarathy [21, 
Theorem 1.10, p. 61). 
Remark. Aumann’s theorem has been generalized to economies where 
the agents may have different consumption sets and where the preferences 
are not assumed to be monotonic. For details see [14] and [16]. 
The following result will be needed in the next section. Since it is closely 
related to Aumann’s theorem it is given here. 
LEMMA. Let v be an atomless measure on A with properties (a) and (6). 
If an attainable allocation f for v is blocked, then there exist a compact 
set K and a continuous function g of K into Rf, such that 
6) for every a E K da> >.f(a>, 
(ii) j-, g dv < j-, w  dv. 
’ In other words, x < z implies x -=C, z. 
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Thus, the core of an atomless economy v is not changed if we strengthen 
the definition of blocking in the above way. 
Proof. Let us call an allocation f strongly blocked if there exist a 
coalition B E gA and a measurable function h of B into R: such that 
(b.1) a.e. in B, h(u) >&f(a), 
(b.3) s, h dv < 1, o dv (compare the definition on p. 167). 
One can show that an attainable allocation which is not strongly blocked 
is a price-equilibrium. One either uses Aumann’s proof in [l] or any other 
proof for the equivalence theorem. 
Since a price-equilibrium is unblocked and since we assumed that f is 
blocked we showed that there exist a coalition B E a* and a measurable 
function h of B into Rf, with properties (b.1) and (b.3). 
According to Lusin’s theorem, for every E > 0 there exists a compact 
subset K, C B with v(B \ KJ < E such that the restriction h 1 K, of h 
on K, is continuous. Consequently, if E is small enough, the strict inequality 
JB h dv < jB w  dv implies SK h dv < SK w  dv, which proves the lemma. 
Q.E.D. 
4. A LIMIT THEOREM ON THE CORE 
Consider a sequence (v,) of simple measures converging to an atomless 
measure v E E and choose for every integer n an allocationf, in the core 
of v, . As explained in the introduction, we want to find conditions which 
imply the existence of a “converging” subsequence of (fJ such that the 
“limit” belongs to the core of v, and consequently, is a price equilibrium. 
In order to find these conditions, let us first consider a sequence (4) 
of replica-economies as in Debreu-Scarf [IO]. We showed in Section 2, 
Example 1 that the sequence (8,) of replica-economies can be represented 
by a sequence (v,) of simple measures converging to an atomless measure v. 
According to [lo, Theorem 2’, p. 2461, an allocation fn in the core of v, 
assigns to all agents of the same type consumptions, indifferent to the 
average of the consumptions for that type. Since (with the notation of 
Example I, p. 11) the average I/n CLJ(x*, ai) for type ai (i = l,..., m) 
is bounded by Cs1 w(aJ, a bound independent of n, we observe the 
following two properties of the sequence (&): 
(i) The sequence (fn) is bounded up to ind@j?&ence, i.e., there exists 
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a bounded sequence (g,), where g, is a function of supp(v,) into R:, 
such that for every a E supp(v,) we havef,(a) -a g,(a), 
(ii) Sufjiciently similar agents are treated equally up to indtj$erence. 
We shall show in this section that these two properties of the sequence 
(fn) seem to be essential in order to prove a limit theorem. The strong 
symmetry in the replica-economy setup reveals quite easily that every 
sequence of allocations has these two properties. They may even hold in 
general, but this is an open problem. First, we shall express property (ii) 
in a way to become applicable to the case of nonreplica-economies. 
Let C be a subset of the set of agents’ characteristics with property (a) 
and (/3) of Section 3. For every a E C and every vector x E R: there is 
a unique vector (E,,,) on the diagonal of R: such that x -0 (tn,J. 
Therefore, the formula u(a, X) = max{e E R+ 1 (t) <,a x} defines a func- 
tion ZI of C x Rz into R, . It is not hard to show that u is a continuous 
function and thit for every a E C, ~(a, .) is a utility index (i.e., order 
preserving) for La 8 (for a proof see Appendix B). 
Given the sequence (frJ of allocations we denote by v,, the utility- 
allocation which corresponds to the allocation fi, , i.e., 
v,@> = 4~ f&N for every a E supp(v,). 
With this notation properties (i) and (ii) become: 
(i) Bounded up to indtjerence. The sequence (v,) is bounded, i.e., 
there is a real number b such that for every n and every a E supp(v,) we 
have v,(a) < b. 
(ii) Similar treatment up to indtyerence. The sequence (v,,) is uniformly 
equi-continuous, i.e., for every E > 0 there is 6 > 0 such that for every n 
and a, a’ E supp(v,) with d(a, a’) < 6 follows 1 v,(a) - v,(a’)j < E. 
Before we go on we should point out that properties (i) and (ii) of a 
sequence of allocations are purely ordinal. This is shown by expressing 
both properties in terms of preference relations. However, in this form 
the properties become less suggestive. It is not hard to show that properties 
(i) and (ii) for a sequence (fn) of anocations are equivalent to the following: 
PROPERTY (*). There exists a bounded sequence (g,), where g, is a 
function of supp(u,) into Ri, such that for every a E supp(v,) we have 
f&4 -a 
with 
g,(u). Further, every subsequence of (g,) has a subsequence (gnJ 
the property: whenever (a,) converges to a E supp(v), where 
B This utility function has been used by Y. Kannai [19] to define a metric on the 
space of agents’ characteristics. 
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a, E ~upp(v,~), it follows that all adherent points of the sequence (g,,(a,)) 
are indzfirent for a. For short, we call a sequence (fn) with property (*) 
bounded and of similar treatment up to indifference. 
The sequence (fn) of allocations for v, is called convergent up to 
indifference to an allocation f for v if the convergence of (a,) to a E supp(v), 
where a, E supp(v,), implies that all adherent points of the sequence 
(f,(a,)) are indifferent (for a) to f(a). 
Clearly, if v, (resp. v) denotes the utility-allocations corresponding 
to fn (resp. f) then the convergence up to indifference for a sequence f, 
which is bounded up to indifference means that the sequence (v,) converges 
continuously9 to u, i.e., whenever (a,) converges to a E supp(v), where 
a, E supp(v,), it follows that v,(a,) converges to v(a). 
Finally, we say that the sequence (fn) converges in the average to f, 
if for every coalition Q C supp(v), whose boundary has v-measure zero, 
we have 
lip lo fm dv, = Jo f dv. 
THEOREM 2. Let (vJ be a sequence of measures converging to an 
atomless measure v in E, where supp(v,) C supp(v), and such that on supp(v) 
assumptions (a) and (/?) hold. Let fn be an allocation in the core of v, 
(n = 1 ,...). If the sequence (fn) is bounded and of similar treatment up to 
indzflerence, then there exists an allocation f in the core of v which is adherent 
to (f,J for the convergence up to indzyerence. If, in addition, we assume that 
all preference relations are convex, lo then there exists an allocation f in the 
core of v which is adherent to (fn) for both the convergence up to indzxerence 
and in the average. 
Before we give a proof of Theorem 2 we state two corollaries. 
COROLLARY 1. Let (v,) and v be as in Theorem 2. Assume that the 
sequence (fn), where fn E core(vJ, converges continuously. Then there is a 
price-vectorp > o with the following property: For every E > 0 there is an 
integer ii such that n 3 ii and a E supp(v,) imply f,(a) E &[[(a,~)], i.e., 
f,(a) has a distance less than E to a greatest element in the budget set 
relative to the price-vector p. 
Proof Since the sequence (fn) converges continuously, there exists 
(Appendix E) a continuous function g of supp(v) into R: such that (fn) 
converges to g uniformly, i.e., for every E > 0 there exists an integer Ti 
s The concept is studied, e.g., in C. Kuratowski [20, p. 931. 
lo In other words, for every z E R: the set {x E R: 1 x >,. z} is convex. 
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such that IZ 3 i? and a E supp(v,) imply If,(u) - g(a)1 < E. This implies 
Jg dv = J o dv; hence, g is an attainable allocation for v. Since the 
sequence cf,) is bounded and of equal treatment up to indifference, there 
exists, according to Theorem 2, an allocation f in the core of v which is, 
adherent to (f%) for the convergence up to indifference. It follows that 
the utility-allocation of g and f are the same. Hence, the continuous 
allocation g belongs to the core of v. According to Aumann’s theorem g is 
a price-equilibrium for v, i.e., there is a price-vector p > 0 such that 
v - a.e. in supp(~), g(u) E ,$(a, p), the set of greatest elements in the 
budget set ~(a, p). We show that the continuity of g implies that 
g(u) E [(a, p) for every a E supp(v). Assume g(C) 4 &ti, p) for some 
5 E supp(v). Since the demand correspondence &., p) is upper hemi- 
continuous and the function on g is continuous, there exists a neighbor- 
hood V of 6 such that g(a) $ ((a, p) f or every a E V. By definition of the 
support of a measure it follows that V(V) > 0 which contradicts that g is a 
price-equilibrium for Y. Hence, g(u) E ((a, p) for every a E supp(~,). 
The corollary now follows from the uniform convergence of (f,) to g. 
Q.E.D. 
If we assume that the sequence (fn) is made up of price-equilibria, 
then we can show that the sequence (f,J is always bounded and of similar 
treatment up to indifference. This leads to the “upper hemi-continuity” 
of the equilibrium-set correspondence at an atomless measure. 
COROLLARY 2.l’ Let the sequence (v,) and the measure v be us in 
Theorem 2. Zf (pn , fn) is a price-equilibrium12 .for v, , then there exist a 
subsequence (p,, , fnC) and a price-equilibrium (p, f) for v such that the 
sequence (p,,) converges to p and the sequence (fn,) converges to f up to 
indtyerence. 
Furthermore, if&preference relations are convex (resp. strongly convex), 
then the sequence (fn,) converges to f in the average (resp. continuously). 
Proof We have to show that the sequence (fn) is bounded and of 
similar treatment up to indifference. By assumption we have f,(u) E &a, pn) 
for every a E supp(v,), hence, v,(a) = u(a, &a, p,)). Let P = (p E Z?lp > 01. 
Since the demand correspondence <(*, .) is upper hemi-continuous on 
supp(v) x P it follows that the function u(a, ((a, p)) is continuous on 
supp(V) x P. 
Further, the sequence (v,) is uniformly equicontinuous if and only if the 
function u(., t(., n)) is uniformly continuous on supp(v) x {pl, pz ,...I. 
I1 The upper hemi-continuity of the equilibrium-set correspondence shall be proved 
more directly and in a more general setup in [18]. 
I2 We assume that p,, is normalized, i.e., x:fzlpn” = 1. 
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Hence, it remains to show that every adherent point of the sequence (pn) 
belongs to P. Without loss of generality we may assume that (p,) converges 
top. Since J fn dv, = J w  dv, converges to J w  dv and since the preference 
relations are assumed to be monotonic it follows that p > 0. In fact 
one can show (see the proof of Theorem 2) that there is an a E supp(v) 
and a sequence (a,) converging to a, where a, E supp(v,), such that the 
sequence (&(a,)) has an adherent point, say z. Since the graph of the 
budget set correspondence y of supp(v) x Rf, in R: is closed and since 
the set {(a, x, u) E supp(v) x R: x R: j x <,a y} is closed it follows 
that z E <(a, p), hence, p > 0. 
Since we just showed that the sequence (fn) of Corollary 2 is bounded 
and of similar treatment up to indifference we can apply Theorem 2. 
Q.E.D. 
Remark. Corollary 2 implies the existence of a price-equilibrium for 
an atomless measure in the case of convex preferences. In fact, Theorem 1 
and the well-known existence theorem for economies with finitely many 
agents shows that there is a sequence (vJ of simple measures and a 
sequence (P,~ , fn) of price-equilibria with all required properties. 
5. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 
The proof is organized as follows: 
(a) First, we show that there is a subsequence of (fJ such that the 
corresponding utility-allocations converge uniformly to a continuous 
function v of supp(v) into R. 
(b) Next, we verify that ZI is an attainable utility-allocation for v, 
i.e., there is an attainable allocation for v whose corresponding utility- 
allocation is a. 
(c) Then it is shown that the utility-allocation a is unblocked for v. 
(d) Finally, we show that the utility-allocation ZI can be realized by an 
attainable allocation f for v which is the limit in the average of a 
subsequence of (fn). 
(a) Since the sequence (fn) is assumed to be bounded and of similar 
treatment up to indifference there exists a subsequence (j$ whose 
corresponding sequence (u,~) of utility-allocations converges contmuously. 
According to Appendix E, 
(1) There is a continuous function u of supp(v) into R such that II,. 
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converges uniformly to U. For simplicity of notation, we may assume that 
the original sequence v, has this property. 
(b) We shall prove: there exists an allocation f for v such that 
Jf dv < J w dv and a.e. in supp(v), v(a) = u(a, f(a)). 
According to Appendix C, there exist measurable mappings 
01, of T = supp(v) into supp(v,) such that 
(2) v, = v 3 a,l and v-a.e. in T, lim, a,(a) = a. 
For every IZ we consider the function f; = fn 0 01, of T into R: . We 
have, by (2), lfR dv = sfn dv, = so dv, . Since the sequence (vJ 
converges to v and since the continuous function w  is bounded on T, 
it follows that lim, J w  dv, = J w  dv and hence, 
(3) lip/$&= jwdv. 
According to Fatou’s lemma in Z-dimensions (see Appendix D) there 
exists an integrable function f of T into Rf, such that 
(4) jfdvgjwdv and 
(5) v-a.e. in K, f(a) is adherent to the sequence (fn(a)),=l,... . 
By definition of the utility-allocation v, and the mapping 01, we have 
vJa,(a)) = u(ol,(a),fJa)), a E T, n = l,... . Therefore, the continuity 
of the function u(., .), properties (l), (2) and (5) imply 
(6) v-a.e. in T, v(a) = u(a, f(a)). 
(c) We shall prove: the allocation f is unblocked for v. Assume f is 
blocked. According to the lemma of Section 3, there exist a compact set K 
with v(K) > 0 and a continuous function g of K into Ri such that 
(7) for every a E K, g(a) >, f(a), i.e., u(a, g(a)) > v(a) and 
(8) jK g dv < j, w dv. 
The last two properties together with (1) would lead at once to a 
contradiction with fn E core(v,) if we would know that 
1 K (g - w)dvn -+ j, (g - ~1 dv. 
But this does not necessarily follow from the convergence of the sequence 
(vJ to v. However, if the set K is such that its boundary has v-measure 
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zero, then the convergence of (v,) to v implies the convergence of the 
above integrals (e.g., Parthasarathy [21, II, Theorem 6.1, p. 401). 
Thus, the essential step in the proof consists of showing that the 
coalition K can be altered to a blocking coalition whose boundary has 
v-measure zero. 
The continuous function g is defined only on K; we extend g to a 
continuous function of T into R: . 
Let E > 0 and consider the set 
0, = {a E T I ~(a, g(a)) > 44 + ~1. 
The set 0, is open in T and contains K for E small enough, say E, since 
K is compact and the functions u(., g(.)) and u(s) are continuous. 
According to Appendix F, (3) for every rl > 0 there exists a set Q whose 
boundary has v-measure zero such that KC Q C 6, and v(Q \ K) < 7. 
Consequently (8) implies that there is a set Q whose boundary has 
v-measure zero and such that 
(9) j, g dv Q s, w dv. 
According to (1) the sequence v, converges uniformly to 21. Since 
Q C 0, and lim, vn(Q) = v(Q) > 0 there exists an integer g such that 
for n 2 g we have vn(Q) > 0 and 
(10) for every a E Q n supp(v,), ~(a, g(4) > v&G, i.e., g(a) >,fnW 
Hence, the coalition Q blocks the allocation fn for sufficiently large n 
which contradicts the assumption that fn belongs to the core of v, . 
(d) We shall prove: there exists a subsequence of cf,) which converges in 
the average to an allocation in the core of v. 
We have shown that every selection f according to Fatou’s lemma is 
unblocked for v and Jf dv < $ w  dv. Since we assumed monotonic 
preferences this implies sfdv = s w  dv. According to the second part of 
Fatou’s lemma (see Appendix D), we have 
(11) the sequence (f”n) is crz(L, , L&relative compact and 
(12) every az(L1 , L,) adherent point f of (fn) has the property: 
v-a.e. in T, f(u) E co Lim Sup [fn(u)]. 
According to (11) and Eberlein’s theorem (Dunford-Schwartz [5, 
Chapter IV, Section 8.8, Theorem 9, p. 2921) there exists a uz(& , L,)- 
converging subsequence of ($). Without loss of generality we can therefore 
assume that the sequence (f,J is az(L1 , L&convergent to an integrable 
function f of T into R: . As in the proof of property (6) one shows that 
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every adherent point of (&a)) has the utility v(u). Since the preference 
relations are assumed to be convex, property (12) implies 
(13) v-a.e. in T, 4&f(a)) 2 44. 
Property (13) clearly implies that the allocation f is unblocked for v. 
It remains to show that the uz(L1, &)-convergence of the sequence ($) 
to f implies that for every Bore1 subset Q, whose boundary has v-measure 
zero, we have lim, so fn dv, = Ja f dv. The last assertion is equivalent to 
lim, J hfn dv, = J hf dv for every continuous and bounded function h of T 
into R (Billingsley [3, Theorem 2.1, p. 111). By (2) it follows that 
Jf,(h o (YJ dv = Jfnh dv,L . It is known that the aZ(L, , L&convergence 
of (& to f and the almost everywhere convergence of the bounded 
sequence (h 0 (II,) to h implies lim, J%(h 0 an) dv = Jfh dv. Hence, it 
follows that lim, jfnh dv, = Jfh dv. 
Remark. Theorem 2 can be extended in several directions. The limit 
measure v need not be atomless if one assumes convex preferences. The 
proof is then similar to the arguments in [18]. Also, one can drop the 
assumption that all consumption sets are equal to the positive orthant 
and that the preferences are strongly monotonic. However, the proof 
becomes more complex and we don’t think that this generality justifies 
the complexity of the arguments. A more general treatment will be given 
elsewhere. 
APPENDIX A 
Let A denote the space of agents’ characteristics endowed with the 
topology of closed-convergence. We shall show that the results of 
G. Debreu in [S] hold in this case. 
(I) The set {(a, x, y) E A x S x S / x <,, y} is closed in A x S x S. 
Let (an , x, , Y,J be a sequence converging to (a, x, J& where x, J&, yn , 
i.e., (x, , yn) E P(u,). By definition of the topology on A, the convergence 
of (a,) to u implies Lim Inf P(ull) = P(u). Thus, the convergence of 
6, , YJ to (x, Y) and (x, , v,) E WJ implies (x, v) E P(4. 
(II) The consumption set correspondence X of A into S has a closed 
graph and is lower hemi-continuous. 
The assertion in (II) is equivalent to: If the sequence (a,) converges to a, 
then lim inf X(u,) = X(u) = Lim Sup X(u,). The last property follows 
at once from the definition of the topology on A. 
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(III) The set-valued function y of A x S into S, defined by y(a, p) = 
(x E X(a) j p . x < p . w(a)}, has a closed graph and is upper and lower 
hemi-continuous on the set MC A x S, where for every (a, p) E M the 
set y(a, p) is convex and compact and where infp . X(a) < p . w(a). 
It follows easily from (II) that the graph of y is closed. Consider the 
correspondence 9 of M into S, defined by 
f(a,p) =bEWIp.x <p.+d) 
The correspondence + is lower hemi-continuous. In fact, let (a, , pn) be 
a sequence converging to (a, p) and x E ?(a, p). According to (II) there 
exists a sequence (x,), where X, E X(a,), such that lim, x, = x. Since 
p . x < p . w(a) we have for II sufficiently large pll . x, < pn . w(a,), hence, 
x, E ?(a,, pll). This proves that + is lower hemi-continuous on M. Since 
y(a,p) is convex it follows that y(a,p) = closure ?(a,~). Therefore, 
the correspondence y is lower hemi-continuous on M. We shall show that 
y is upper hemi-continuous on M. Let (a, , pn) be a sequence in M con- 
verging to (a, p) and let (x,) be a sequence with xn E y(a, , p,). We have 
to show that there is a converging subsequence of (x,) whose limit belongs 
to y(a,p). Since the correspondence y has a closed graph we have only 
to show that the sequence (x,) is bounded. 
Consider the E-neighborhood B&(a, p)] of y(a, p) and let z E y(a, p). 
Since y is lower hemi-continuous there exists a sequence (zJ converging 
to z with z, E y(a, , p,J. Hence, we have z, E B&(a, p)] for n large 
enough. Assume the sequence (x,) is unbounded. Hence, there are 
infinitely many x,‘s which do not belong to B,[y(a, p)]. Since y(a12 , pJ 
is convex the segment [x~ , zn] belongs to y(a, , plz). Consequently, there 
exists a sequence (x;,&~,... , where xaR ; y(a,, , p,,), such that 
d[xL , y(a,p)] = E. Since the sequence (xi,) is bounded it has a con- 
verging subsequence whose limit x has the distance E from y(a,p). Since 
the graph of y is closed the limit x belongs to y(a, p); a contradiction. 
(IV) Let the subset M of A x S be such that for every (a, p) E M the 
consumption set X(a) is convex, &, is a complete continuous preordering, 
the budget set y(u, p) is compact and infp . X(a) <p . w(a). Then the 
demand correspondence t of M into S is upper hemi-continuous. 
Since y is upper hemi-continuous and ,$ = .$ n y we have only to show 
that the graph of 5 is closed. 
Let (an , pn) be a sequence in M converging to (a, p) and let (x=) be a 
sequence converging to X, where x, E %(a, , pn) (recall that the assumptions 
clearly imply &a, , ~2 f 4). S ince the graph of y is closed we have 
x E y(a,p). Let z E X(u) such that p . z <p . w(a). Since by (II) the con- 
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sumption set correspondence X is lower hemi-continuous there exists 
a sequence (z,) converging to z with z,~ E x(a,). Thus, for n large enough, 
Pn . zn < Pn ~4?2). 
Hence, z, <,a x,, which implies by (I), z <,a x. Thus, we showed that 
z La x for al1 z E ~(a, p) with p . z < p . w(a). Since ~(a, p) is convex, 
every point in y(a, p) can be obtained as a limit of such points. This 
proves that x E f(a, p), and hence, that the graph of 5 is closed. 
APPENDIX B: CONTINUITY OF THE UTILITY FUNCTION u 
Let C be a subset of the space A of agents’ characteristics such that 
for every a E C the consumption set x(a) = Ri and the preference 
relation sa is a complete monotonic13 continuous preordering. For every 
a E C and x E R: define 
~(a, 4 = maxi5 E R+ I (0 (,a 4. 
One easily verifies that for every a E C the function ~(a, a) is a utility 
for <,a (i.e., order preserving). We shall show that u(., .) of C x R: 
into R, is continuous. 
Let (a, , x,) be a sequence converging to (a, x). First, we show that 
lim, ~(a, , x,) exists. Clearly, the sequence ~(a, , x,) is bounded. Assume 
the subsequence u(aQg, x, ) converges to 5 and the subsequence ~(a,, , x,J 
converges to .$‘, where “.$ f 5’. Let 5 < 5’. Since (~(a, , x,)) -a x, 
it follows by property (I) of Appendix A that (E’) ;<,a x. Hence, (5) <“, x, 
and consequently, (~(a,~, 
to the definition of u. 
x,~)) xang x”* for q large enough; a contradiction 
It follows easily now that ~(a, x) = lim, ~(a,, x,). In fact, 
wn > xn)) ;<,a, x, implies lim, ~(a,, x,)5, x, i.e., ~(a, x) slim, zr(a, , x,). 
Since ~(a, x) = min{f E R, / x La (f)}, it follows analogously that 
~(a, x) < lim, ~(a, , x,). 
APPENDIX C 
The following version of Skorokhod’s lemma [24, Chapter I, Section 6, 
p. lo] is due to David A. Freedman: 
Let K be a compact metric space and (vn) a sequence of measures con- 
I3 In other words, x Q y implies x <, y. 
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verging weakly to v. Assume that v is atomless and supp(v) = K. Then 
there exists a sequence (an) of measurable functions of K into K such that 
V n = va,l and v-a.e. in K, lim, a,(x) = x. 
APPENDIX D: FATOU'S LEMMA IN SEVERAL DIMENSIONS 
Let (Q, 3, v) be a measure space and (fn) a sequence of v-integrable 
functions of Q into R: . Suppose lim, sn fn dv exists. Then there is a 
v-integrable functionf of J2 into R: such that 
a.e. in IR, f(w) E Lim Sup(fn(w)} and 
I R 
f dv < IiF 
s 
p fn dv. 
IL for ecery function f with these properties, one has ssa f dv = lim Sn fn dv, 
then the sequence (fn) is relative ot(L, , L&compact and every adherent 
point g has the property: a.e. in Q, g(w) belongs to the convex hull of 
Lim Sup{f,(w)I. 
For a proof see D. Schmeidler [23] and [17]. 
APPENDIX E: CONTINUOUS CONVERGENCE 
Let (S,) be a sequence of subsets in a metric space (M, d) such that 
S, C Lim Sup, S, = S. For every n let f% be a function of S, into R such 
that the sequence (fn) converges continuously, i.e., for every sequence (x,) 
converging to x E S, where x, E S, , the limit lim fn(xn) exists. 
Clearly, the existence of these limits determines a function f of 
Lim Sup, S, = S into R, defined by f(x) = lim, fn(xn). 
We shall show: 
Zf the sequence (fn) converges continuously, then the limit f is a continuous 
function. Further, for every compact subset KC S and every E > 0 there is 
6 > 0 and an integer ii such that n > ii, x E K and y E S, with d(x, y) < 6 
imply 
I.f(x) -fn(Y)I G E. 
Thus, in particular, the sequence (fn) converges to f untformly on compact 
sets. 
Proof. One verifies easily that for every x E S and every E > 0 there is a 
St,,,, > 0 and an integer n(,,,) such that n 2 n(z,r) and y E S, with 
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4x, Y) < b.d imply If(x) -fnty)l d E. Therefore, if the sequence (x~) 
converges to x, where xk E S, , there is for every xk a point ynh E &, with 
4ynk 9 xk) d min@(!+k), l/k) such that If(xk) -fi&‘n,>i < l/k. b’ 
construction the sequence (y,,) converges to x. The inequality 
Iftx> -f(xk)i < If(x) -fn,<Ynk)i + bti&n,) -ftxk>i 
implies the continuity off. 
Assume that the property, claimed above, does not hold. Then there is 
a compact set KC M and E > 0 such that for every Z and 6 > 0 there is 
an integer n > ii and there exist points x E K and y E S, with d(x, y) < 6 
such that I f(x) - fn( y)l > E. Therefore, we can construct a sequence (x,) 
in K and a sequence (y,), where y, E &, , with lim, d(x, , yJ = 0 such 
that I f(x,) - fn,(ya)i > E. Since K is compact we can assume without loss 
of generality that the sequence (x,) is convergent, say lim, x, = x. Hence, 
lim, f(x,) = f(x). Since the sequence (y,) converges also to x we have 
lim,f, (Y,) =f(x). Hence, If&,) -h$v,>I -c E for q large enough, 
a contiadiction. 
APPENDIX F 
The following results are more or less well-known but we could find no 
references. 
(1) Let A4 be a compact metric space. A measure v on A4 is atomless 
if and only iffor every B E SYM with v(B) > 0 there is a set E E SYM with 
ECB and 0 < v(E)<v(B). 
This follows at once from the following result: 
Let A be an atom in (M, SYM, v) (i.e., v(A) > 0 and B C A, B E aM, 
impZies v(B) = v(A) or v(B) = 0) then there is a point a E A such that 
44 = 4M9. 
Proof. Since the measure v is regular (Parthasarathy [21, Theorem 1.2, 
p. 271) we can assume without loss of generality that the atom is closed. 
Let C denote the intersection of all closed subsets in A which have the 
same measure as A. It follows that v(A) = v(C). (Parthasarathy [21, 
Theorem 2.1, p. 271). But v(C) > 0 implies C # 4, Let a E C and let U 
be an arbitrary open neighborhood of a in C. We have either v(U) = 0, 
which leads to a contradiction to the definition of the set C, or v(U) = v(A), 
which implies that C is equal to the closure of U. Hence, C = {a}. Q.E.D. 
(2) Let (v,)~=~,... be a sequence of measures on a separable metric 
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space M converging weakly to a measure v on M and assume 
supp(v,) C sLlpp(v), n = l,... . Then supp(v) = Lim Sup supp(v,). 
Proof. Clearly, Lim Sup, supp(v,) = UT==, closure uz=, supp(v,). We 
shall show that supp(v) C closure lJz=, supp(v,) for all 12. Let x be an 
arbitrary point in supp(v) and U an open neighborhood of x. Assume 
U n Uz=, supp(v,) = $. The weak convergence of (vn) to v is equivalent 
to lim inf, v,(U) 3 v(0) for every open set (e.g., Parthasarathy [21, 
Chapter II, Theorem 6.1, p. 401). Thus, in particular, 
0 = limninf v,(U) > v(U) 3 0. 
But v(U) = 0 and U n supp(v) + $I is a contradiction to the definition 
of the support of v. Q.E.D. 
(3) Let v be a measure on a metric space M, K a compact and 0 an open 
set in M with KC 9. Then there exists a set Q in M whose boundary has 
v-measure zero and such that KC Q C 0. 
Proof. There exists a continuous function h of M into [0, l] such 
thathIK=OandhIM\Cn=l,e.g., 
h(x) = 0, K) 
4x, K) + 4x, M \ 0) * 
Consider the distribution function H of h, i.e., 
H(A) = v{x E M 1 h(x) < A}. 
The function H of R into [0, l] is increasing and therefore, has only 
countable many points of discontinuity. If h, with 0 < h < 1, is a con- 
tinuity point of H, the set Q = (x E M I h(x) < h} has all the required 
properties. Q.E.D. 
(4) Let (vn) be a sequence of measures on a metric space M converging 
weakly to an atomless measure v. Then, for every x E M and every E > 0 
there exists a neighborhood U, such that v,(U,) < E for all n su#iciently 
large. 
Proof. Clearly, there exists a neighborhood of the point x, and even 
by (3) a neighborhood U whose boundary has measure zero, such that 
v(U) < e/2. The weak convergence of (vJ to v implies v,(U) -+ v(U). 
Thus, for n sufficiently large 
I v,(U) - v( U)l < E/2. 
Hence, I v,(U)1 ,( I v,(U) - v(U)1 + v(U) < E. Q.E.D. 
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